## Politics

The Syria authorization will pass but it will be a tough fight - capital is key to GOP support

Cohen, 9/3/13 (Tom, “Syria war resolution faces tough challenge in Congress” CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/politics/obama-syria-congress/>)

To Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution, support from the House is the biggest challenge for Obama. "There are very few moderates that are left and it's a highly polarized institution," he noted, adding that what amounts to a war authorization vote was likely to shake up the normal partisan line in Congress. "You could have libertarian Republicans joining liberal Democrats to vote no, just because they're tired of foreign adventures," West said. "It may come down to Republicans who support a strong foreign policy joining forces with Democratic moderates to give approval." A new ABC News/Washington Post poll released Tuesday showed that nearly six in 10 Americans oppose military strikes against Syria, with similar results from respondents identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans. The administration has launched what it calls a "flood the zone" lobbying effort to persuade legislators to support the resolution authorizing military strikes against Syria. This effort in Washington includes classified briefings, testimony of Cabinet members at committee hearings, and meetings with the president. Mindful of concerns that a strike on Syria will lead to a prolonged engagement, Obama said Tuesday that "this is not Iraq, and this is not Afghanistan." "This is a limited, proportional step that will send a clear message -- not only to the Assad regime, but also to other countries that may be interested in testing some of these international norms -- that there are consequences," the president said. At the hearing by the Senate panel he used to chair, Secretary of State John Kerry later said that "neither our country nor our conscience can afford the cost of silence." However, Obama departs on Tuesday night on a four-day trip to Sweden and Russia at a time when members of both parties clamor for him to be directly involved. With congressional elections next year, many legislators feel that the safe vote on Syria right now is to oppose the Obama resolution, CNN Chief National Correspondent John King said Tuesday. "The president has to sway and the most important people he'll meet with today are the House Republicans," King said. "He doesn't have good relationships with them, very few personal relationships with them. They don't trust him. They don't support most of his other policy initiatives." Speaking before Boehner and Cantor publicly backed Obama, King said the president needed the House GOP leadership to "lobby their own members, saying this is the right thing to do even if you don't agree with the president." Cantor's statement did just that, even taking on a popular GOP talking point that Obama had erred by previously declaring chemical weapons use a "red line" that would bring a U.S. response if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed it. "The United States' broader policy goal, as articulated by the president, is that Assad should go, and President Obama's red line is consistent with that goal and with the goal of deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction," Cantor said in the statement. "It is the type of red line virtually any American president would draw." However, Boehner's spokesman, Michael Steel, made clear that the speaker was leaving it to Obama to persuade legislators to support him. "It is the president's responsibility to make his case to the American people and their elected representatives," Steel said in a statement, adding that "all votes authorizing the use of military force are conscience votes for members, and passage will require direct, continuous engagement from the White House." Obama met Monday with two veteran Republican senators -- John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina -- who emerged to say they could support a more precise and robust strategy than the president initially outlined. In particular, McCain and Graham said Obama pledged increased military aid to opposition forces in Syria that would bolster their fight against al-Assad at the same time as U.S. military attacks expected to to involve cruise missile strikes on Syrian military command targets. After Obama met Tuesday with Boehner, Pelosi and the chairs of several national security committees in Congress, legislators from both parties said they expected the initial resolution proposed by the president to be revised to address their concerns. In particular, they said it would define the mission more narrowly and specify no "boots on the ground," which means no U.S. troops would be deployed to Syria. West noted that no matter what lobbying takes place, "there are some Republicans who will vote 'no' just because the idea came from President Obama" because "they detest everything he stands for." Moderates, meanwhile, may face the prospect of a primary challenge from the more extremist wing of their respective party if they authorize a war resolution, he said. "Anti-war sentiment remains very strong within the Democratic Party," West said, noting that grass-roots activists on the left opposed the Iraq war at the height of post 9/11 patriotic fervor. "The idea of another foreign intervention would be of great concern to those people." In the end, West said he expects Obama's resolution to win approval because "the president has laid national prestige on the line." However, a House GOP leadership aide told CNN that "it is going to be a big lift to get this done." "We're only going to be able to help the president as much as he's willing to help himself," the aide said on condition of not being identified, noting Obama must be personally involved, make the case for military action and "prove that we have a military plan that will work and not drag us into the mud for a long time."

Cuba Lobby, campaign contributions, GOP, Dem Unity, Filibuster, Committee, Menendez and Reid duo cost Obama immense political capital and overwhelms any tuns - empirics

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The 113th Congress Congress has held a central role in U.S. policy toward Cuba ever since it codified the U.S. embargo into law in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton). To move beyond limited improvements in relations on issues of mutual interest or limited commercial activity– that is, to move toward the full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations– the president would have to win congressional approval to change the law. In 2000, the Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which legalized the sale of food products to Cuba, albeit on a cash-only basis, but at the same time prohibited tourist travel by U.S. residents. For the next four years, the bipartisan Cuba Working Group in the House of Representatives worked to end all prohibitions on travel to Cuba. In 2001, Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), the founder along with Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) of the Cuba Working Group, introduced an amendment to the Treasury appropriation bill prohibiting enforcement of the travel ban. The House approved it in July by a wide margin (240-186), but it was dropped in conference committee by the Republican House leadership in response to Bush’s veto threat. For the next three years, this scenario was replayed annually. The House (and the 27 Senate in 2003 and 2004) voted to end enforcement of the travel ban, but congressional Republicans conspired with the White House to prevent it from becoming law by repeatedly dropping the provision from the final bill. “People are wrong to underestimate what it means to have President Bush on our side,” Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fla) said with satisfaction. By 2005, 28 a sense of futility had eroded the Cuba Working Group. Aided by campaign contributions to key members of the House from the new pro-embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, Republicans were able to defeat amendments easing restrictions on travel to Cuba and block consideration of others in 2005 and 2006.29 With President Obama promising a new policy of engagement toward Cuba and having lifted travel restrictions on Cuban Americans in 2009, freedom-to-travel advocates launched a new congressional campaign to lift the travel ban. With large Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, hopes ran high for success. Over 170 cosponsors quickly signed on in the House. A broad coalition of some 130 business groups and foreign policy NGOs formed behind the campaign, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Farm Bureau Federation, National Farmers Union, American Society of Travel Agents, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. The travel web site Orbitz collected over 100,000 signatures on a petition to lift the travel ban. As a measure of its commitment, the Chamber of Commerce warned legislators that their vote on Cuba would be “scored” as a key business vote included in the Chamber’s annual “How They Voted” scorecard.30 Public opinion, even among Cuban-Americans, favored the freedom to travel. A 2008 poll in south Florida by Florida International University found that 67% favored “ending current travel restrictions for all Americans.” A national poll of Cuban-Americans the following year by Bendixen and Associates found the same result, and a 2010 poll by a faculty member at the University of Miami found support at 64%. The general public’s view was even more lopsided: 31 70% favored unrestricted travel to Cuba, and even 62% of Republicans agreed.32 Opponents blasted the freedom-to-travel coalition as venial for putting dollars ahead of human rights. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who pledged to filibuster the bill if it ever got to the Senate, denounced businessmen who “only care about padding their profits by opening up a new market,” even though it meant “enriching the Castro regime.” Congresswoman Ros 33 Lehtinen attacked proponents of free travel for, “seek[ing] to reward the Cuban regime with tourism cash flows as the dictatorship tightens its stranglehold on the Cuban people.”34 The legislative vehicle for opening travel and facilitating agricultural sales was House Resolution (H.R.) 4645, the “Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act,” cosponsored by House Agricultural Committee Chair Collin Peterson (D-Minn) and Jerry Moran (R-Kan.). It cleared the Agricultural Committee on July 1, 2010, by a narrow 25-20 margin, and was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. For weeks, Committee Chair Howard Berman (D-Calif.) tried to collect the votes needed to report the bill out to the House floor. In September, still one or two votes short, with Congress drawing to a close for the election campaign, he gave up. The bill died in committee. The principal obstacle faced by supporters of the travel bill was not the opposition of Republicans like Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balart brothers, but opposition from moderate and conservative Democrats. In the Senate, not only did Menendez promise to block any travel bill, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev) also opposed unfettered travel, and he controlled the flow of legislation to the Senate floor. In the House, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, a rising star of the party from south Florida, took it upon herself to organize opposition to the travel bill within the Democratic caucus. Wasserman Schultz was in charge of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's “Red to Blue” project in the 2008 election cycle, aimed at unseating Republican incumbents (though not in south Florida, where Wasserman Schultz refused to campaign against her three Republican friends– Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balarts). Many freshman Democrats– especially those from relatively conservative districts– were in her debt. A vote on Cuba, which was not a salient or popular issue in their constituencies, was a small price to pay to stay in Wasserman Schultz’s good graces. When supporters of the travel bill first rolled it out with 178 cosponsors, Wasserman Schultz recruited 53 House Democrats to write a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi declaring their determination to vote against it– a formidable number that foreshadowed a nasty battle inside the Democratic caucus if the bill went to the House floor, and put final passage in doubt. In 2011, President Obama selected Wasserman Schultz to chair the Democratic National Committee

Capital is finite and Syria requires all of it – the plan burns his leverage and consumes docket time and energy

Brown, 9/4/13 (Carrie, Politico, “Obama's capital spreads thin”

<http://m.politico.com/iphone/story/0913/96306.html>)

President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform. Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities. A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval. “The only effect is — and I don’t mean this to be dismissive in any way — it will be taking up some time and there be some degree of political capital expended by all,” said Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the Foreign Relations Committee ranking member who helped draft the Senate resolution. “At the end of the day, it’s a tough vote for anybody because the issue is trying to draft an authorization knowing that they’re going to implement it.” The West Wing says it’s too early to know how Obama’s surprise decision to seek congressional authorization will affect the rest of his agenda, but his advisers are betting that a win could usher in other domestic successes. A failed vote, however, would undoubtedly weaken him. A senior administration official said the effort could build some trust between the White House and Republicans that might ease tensions in negotiations over the budget and other issues. White House aides have long argued that success begets success. Their latest test of that theory was the broad bipartisan Senate vote for comprehensive immigration reform bill, which was supposed to compel the House to act. So far, it has not — and House Republicans don’t think the Syria vote will be any different. “The idea that passing the authorization for use of military force in Syria would give the administration more leverage in future political debates is absurd,” one senior GOP leadership aide said. “They are currently spending political capital they don’t have.” No matter how it plays out, the sudden emergence of a fight over Syria presents both political and logistical challenges for Congress and the White House. House Republicans were already grumbling about the prospect of several perilous votes this fall — first on raising the debt limit and extending government funding, then on a package of reforms to the immigration system. White House aides began hearing skepticism from Republican leaders that they could force a debt limit hike through the chamber and then press for passage of even a pared-back immigration bill. Adding a vote on military intervention in Syria could create even more friction between the Obama administration and House Republicans, as lawmakers are being put in a position of potentially voting against their party leaders. House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) are backing Obama, but the vast majority of the conference appears to oppose the resolution, at least at this point. And even before Syria took over the headlines, there was very little time on the congressional calendar to address those issues — as well as the confirmation of the yet-to-be-nominated Federal Reserve chairman. As much as Obama likes to say the White House and Congress should “be able to walk and chew gum at the same time,” often they cannot.

A failed Syria vote spurs global appeasement, allied prolif, nuclear use and shreds U.S. primacy

Cohen, 9/2/13 - teaches at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. From 2007-08 he served as counselor of the State Department (Eliot, “The Stakes on the Syria Vote” Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432404579049261525066516.html>)

On Saturday, when President Obama overruled his advisers, reversed his own policy and declared that he would not act against Syria until Congress has had its say, he did not—as he might have—recall Congress for that purpose. Instead, Mr. Obama said he would let the vote wait for 10 days or more. Then he promptly left the White House for the golf course. Later this week, he'll travel to Stockholm and then to St. Petersburg, Russia, for a G-20 economic summit. Mr. Obama's dwindling band of defenders insist that this decision "to seek authorization for the use of force from the American people's representatives in Congress" was a matter of principle which had escaped him in Libya in 2011, and that only occurred to him now after many days of plotting an air campaign against the Syrian government for its use of chemical weapons. Others, less charitably inclined, see in his Saturday announcement a mixture of unworthy motives—an outright panic when British Prime Minister David Cameron lost a war vote in the House of Commons; an unbecoming wish that Congress would give him an excuse for inaction; and an unworthy scheme to stick his enemies (as he understands them) in Congress with a responsibility he hopes to shirk. It is beside the point to assess these motives. Congress now has decisions to make. This is the argument that lies before them. The case against authorizing the use of force begins with an indictment of the administration's feckless policy toward Syria. Mr. Obama chose passivity two years ago when he might have tipped the balance to a then largely secular opposition. He concocted and then ignored red lines regarding the use of chemical weapons. And he has, with this latest backflip, shown himself eager to squirm out of his own commitments, even as the rhetoric of his pronouncements ("limited," "tailored," "no boots on the ground," etc.) indicates far more interest in what the U.S. will not do than what it should do, and why. The president's critics will further note, and correctly, that war is war, and, as such, unpredictable. As Winston Churchill put it: "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter." Despite Mr. Obama's statements about narrowly defined goals, precise uses of force and limited duration, it is entirely reasonable to expect that such a strange voyage may lie ahead once operations begin, and that he is singularly ill-fitted to navigate it. Finally, as a practical matter, critics can ask why the U.S. should intervene after a massacre, however hideous, of some 1,400 Syrians, when America has refused to act over the slaughter of 100,000 in the preceding two years. And, even if the U.S. strikes at Assad and helps bring about his downfall, the danger is real that having administered a defeat to the regime and its sponsor, Iran, America will hand a victory to al Qaeda. These are all serious arguments. But weightier are the counterarguments. For better or for worse, the credibility not only of this president, but of America as a global power and a guarantor of international order, is on the line. If the U.S.—after its president said two years ago that Assad must go and then, a year later, drew a red line at Syria's use of chemical weapons—now does nothing, profound conclusions will be drawn by a China ready to bully its neighbors, by a North Korea whose scruples are already minimal, and by an Iran that has already killed many Americans in a covert war waged against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. America's friends will realize that its word means nothing. As a result, they will either abandon us, or arm themselves with nuclear weapons. And these countries will be increasingly willing to wield them in a world in which they have no great ally who may be counted upon to stand by them in an hour of need. One has to suspect that the Syrian government deliberately used sarin in the Damascus suburbs while United Nations inspectors were in the capital, and on the eve of the anniversary of Mr. Obama's red line statement. The essence of tyranny is this message to a population: "We will impose our will on you. No one cares about your suffering, and no one will do anything to rescue you." Assad's message was delivered by chemical weapons of mass destruction. Civilized nations let that message remain unanswered at their peril. The U.S. now faces a twofold problem. The first is that many Americans who came of age in the past 25 years, having grown up in a world that has been shaped by U.S. primacy, take that primacy and the stability and prosperity it has brought for granted. They should not. It hangs in the balance.

Extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” The World Politics Review, March 7, 2011, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, and a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress. The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you know your history, that should make you nervous.

## CP

Text: The United States federal government should establish a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to study current U.S. policy on Cuba. The Commission should recommend phasing out a substantial portion of its economic restrictions towards Cuba

A Bipartisan Commission on Cuba solves the case but avoids politics

Ratliff, 13 - research fellow and former curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution. He is also a research fellow of the Independent Institute. An expert on Latin America, China, and US foreign policy, he has written extensively on how traditional cultures and institutions influence current conditions and on prospects for economic and political development in East/Southeast Asia and Latin America (William, “Cuba's Tortured Transition” 1/30,

http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281

A New Policy to Cuba

Since the early 1990s U.S. “proactive” policies have done more to stoke than reduce domestic tensions in Cuba, though we profess to seek a “peaceful transition.” Most U.S. legislators have supported pro-embargo Cuban-Americans even though Gallup polls have long shown that most Americans favor diplomatic relations with Havana and lifting the embargo. On balance, politicians don’t think Cuba policy is important enough to be worth stirring up the hornets in the still fairly militant and well-financed pro-embargo lobby. Not only have all presidential candidates including Obama supported the embargo, most have resisted even seriously discussing it.

This U.S. commitment to a failed policy has given Washington a "special stake” in the island’s so-called “independent” sector whose goals appeal to Americans. But tragically, paraphrasing journalist Scotty Reston, Americans will do anything for these dissidents except listen to them. My talks with many in Cuba and abroad suggest that most oppose the embargo and three have co-authored articles with me saying so. If these dissidents come under focused government fire in the years ahead, many Americans will feel compelled to intervene even more directly—perhaps militarily—on their behalf.

Two points stand out: Cuba is not the security threat that our current policy treats it as; and our sanctions do not advance the desirable political, economic, and humanitarian improvements that we say we seek on the island. The bottom line is that we must base our policy on national security interests and realities, not unattainable dreams, however noble those dreams may seem.

During his second and final term, and after having drawn unprecedented electoral support as a Democrat from Cuban-Americans in Miami, President Obama is in a position to make serious reforms, if he has the will to do so. He might begin by resurrecting a 1998-99 proposal—then endorsed by former secretaries of state Kissinger and George Shultz, but killed by President Clinton—for convening a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to seriously examine the pros and cons of the policy. It would certainly see the need for change and its findings would give Obama cover for action.

## China DA

Chinese influence in Cuba is high now.

Xinhua 7/24 (7/24/13, “Chinese leader stresses close ties with Cuba,” http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8340137.html)//DR. H

Chinese leader Liu Yunshan said Wednesday that China and Cuba are closely tied with common aspiration and belief despite the two countries being geographically far apart.

Liu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), made the remark as he met with Jose Ramon Balaguer, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of Cuba.

Liu said the new Chinese leadership with Xi Jinping as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee cherishes the time-honored friendship between China and Cuba. The leadership will continue to work with the Communist Party of Cuba to step up the exchange of experience in governance, boost cooperation in various fields, promote friendly contact between the two countries and peoples and open up a new era of China-Cuba friendship.

Liu praised the new achievements Cuba has made in its socialist development and briefed the guests about the domestic situation of China.

Balaguenr said Cuba places great importance on relations between the two countries and their ruling parties. He expressed readiness to work with China to maintain and advance the rapid development of Cuba-China relations. He briefed Liu on the current situation of Cuba and the Communist Party of Cuba.

Changes in US-Cuba policy effect overall influence in Latin America – crowds China out

Doherty 8 (Patrick, "An Obama Policy for Cuba," McClathy Newspapers, December 12, cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/obama\_policy\_cuba\_9301)

With his national security team in place, President-elect Barack Obama's foreign policy principals will be immediately struck by how many complex and expensive challenges they will face. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and Russia, will all require enormous energy, all the tools in our foreign policy toolbox, and will all take years to resolve, if they can be resolved. None of these crises will allow President Obama to signal swiftly to the world the kind of changes he proposes in American foreign policy. In contrast, U.S.-Cuba policy is low-hanging fruit: though of marginal importance domestically, it could be changed immediately at little cost. At present, that policy is a major black spot on America's international reputation. For the rest of the world, our failed, obsolete and 50-year old policy toward Cuba goes against everything that Obama campaigned for, and the recent 185-3 U.N. vote to condemn the centerpiece of that policy, the embargo – the 16th such vote in as many years – makes that clear. The entire world believes our policy is wrong. And the world is right. The fact is that since Cuba stopped exporting revolution and started exporting doctors and nurses, it ceased being a national security concern for the United States. And yet we restrict travel to the island - unconstitutionally - and constrain Cuban-Americans in the amount of money they can send to their families on the island. Moreover, the economic embargo hurts the Cuban people more than the Cuban leadership, and our Helms-Burton legislation imposes Washington's will on foreign businesses who wish to trade with Cuba, creating ill will in business communities from Canada to Brazil. Our Cuba policy is also an obstacle to striking a new relationship with the nations of Latin America. Any 21st-century policy toward Latin America will have to shift from the Cold War-era emphasis on right-wing governments and top-down economic adjustment to creating a hemispheric partnership to address many critical issues: the revival of militant leftism, the twin challenges of sustainability and inclusive economic growth, and the rising hemispheric influence of Russia and China. But until Washington ends the extraordinary sanctions that comprise the Cuba embargo, Latin America will remain at arms-length, and the problems in our backyard - Hugo Chavez, drugs, immigration, energy insecurity - will simply fester.

China engagement key to diplomatically isolating Taiwan.

Ellis ’11 (R. Evans is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,” JFQ, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)

Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opport-unities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13

Peaceful unification of Taiwan depends on China’s economic leverage and growing diplomatic recognition – the alternative is war.

Lee 13 (Dennis, Harvard International Review, “A Narrowing Strait” Global Security Notebook, January 28, 2013, <http://hir.harvard.edu/a-narrowing-strait>)

Since the 1970s, the cross-straits relationship has swung drastically in China’s favor. Not only has the Chinese economy boomed since the opening of its markets, but the United States has started to abandon Taiwan militarily as well. Now inferior in both economic and military strength, Taiwan can only hope for continued de-facto independence. At present, the hopes for remaining separate are dwindling. With China gaining prominence in Asia and the global stage, Taiwan may not have a choice in the matter. Cultural differences present the greatest challenge to the Chinese assimilation of Taiwan. The distinctiveness of Taiwanese culture has already become quite evident since the Kuomintang escaped to the island decades ago. During his presidency, Chen Shui-bian argued frequently that the Taiwanese culture had evolved to be ethnically different and that, in consequence, Taiwan deserves independence. While this argument is unlikely to hold in China at the present, as time passes, it will inevitably become reality. However, the current Chinese strategy almost completely ignores this barrier. China is preparing Taiwanese society for assimilation. Economically, the Chinese are promoting an increase in Taiwanese investment and trade. By offering a profitable economic future, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is luring Taiwanese businessmen and entrepreneurs to the mainland. This has led to integration of some Taiwanese into Chinese society. Not only does this change the Chinese perception of Taiwan, but it also affects the Taiwanese perception of China. Opening the two societies to each other makes reunification easier and the Chinese hope to eventually reach a point where unification is smooth for both sides. Economic leverage on politics is also powerful. The strength of Chinese influence and intervention in Taiwanese politics increases substantially from this economic integration. While it is possible for the reverse to happen, where Taiwanese influence is exerted on the Chinese political apparatus, the fact that China has a fairly closed, one-party government makes this rather unlikely. On the contrary, the Taiwanese government is much more prone to lobbying, and, as a result, can be subject to more leverage from mainland China. This completely lopsided trade relationship can, and likely will, be used to China’s favor. Yet despite the potential political and economic connections, the social differences between China and Taiwan may simply be too drastic to reconcile. Taiwan’s democratic way of government is something that the Taiwanese people hold on to rather dearly. It is high unlikely, if not impossible, for the Taiwanese to give that up, even in the event of an all-out military conflict. The Chinese solution to this problem may be one that is not a new concept in the country and would call for a “one state, two systems” approach. Currently in the PRC, both Hong Kong and Macau are Special Administrative Regions with local rule, differing judicial systems, and influential local governments. Inner Mongolia goes further as an autonomous region of China granted a greater degree of self-rule. This “two systems” doctrine has fallen out of favor in Taiwan recently due to opposition of its current implementation in China, but also represents a potential path to unification. All this begs the question of what would occur if Taiwan were to refuse China’s call for unification. Many Taiwanese believe that their rejection of reunification, by a possible declaration of independence, would trigger Chinese military aggression across the Taiwan Strait. The military hostility between both countries is not new. Throughout the conflict, Taiwan has relied on its own military, as well as that of the United States, as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. On the other hand, China has used its military might to ward off any declarations of independence on the part of Taiwan. This impasse has changed as of late since the current pact between the United States and Taiwan does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. One would assume that in the event of military aggression, the United States would hesitate to entering a military conflict with a fellow nuclear power. Recent technological investments in the Chinese military only heighten the stakes of the conflict and make Taiwanese-Mainland reunification a certainty in China, with the only uncertainty being the question of whether military conflict will prove necessary to the realization of this goal. If China continues to push for unification, unification will most likely occur. Taiwanese resistance is weak without foreign assistance and Taiwan is overpowered economically and militarily. Foreign intervention is fickle and varies with each US administration, public support, and other international factors, thus making both US intervention and Taiwanese independence highly unlikely.

That war goes nuclear

Lowther 3-16, William, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

## Frontier K

The affirmative’s calls to “save the day” in Cuba through American engagement repeating the idea of the cultural deployment of military power throughout Latin America.

McPherson 09 (Alan, Associate professor of international and area studies and the Conoco Phillips Chair in Latin American Studies at the University of Oklahoma, April 2009, “Review of Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos by Louis A. Pérez,” JSTOR)//DR. H

The author now argues in Cuba in the American Imagination that metaphors of Cuba legitimated U.S. power by articulating a moral imperative that compelled Americans to dominate the island for their self-interest while pretending to do so selflessly for Cuba's benefit. From the day Americans imagined Cuba "at our very door" or as a "ripe fruit" in the nineteenth century, through turning points such as the war against Spain (and Cuban sovereignty) and the Cuban Revolution, Americans thought of Cuba using naturalized images–Cuba as a woman, as a child–that fit into normative patterns that the American public and its policymakers read as a warrant for imperial behavior (pp. 28, 30).

The argument is not necessarily new. Perez himself has made it previously, and John Johnson in Latin America in Caricature presented several cartoons in support of it. But the astounding variety and specificity of the metaphors examined and the breadth of the evidence make this book a must-read. The author reproduces no less than 105 illustrations, almost all of them U.S. cartoons.

In them, as well as in Congressional speeches, editorials, histories, films, travel books, novels, poems, theatre, and commemorations, the metaphors were obvious. In the nineteenth century, the image of proximity–Cuba as "almost within sight"–indicated that the colony beckoned to be taken from Spain (p. 27). Right after 1898, Cuba as child either misbehaving in a classroom, learning to ride a bike, or navigating a raft telegraphed U.S. doubts about Cuban self-government. Metaphors of cleanliness, meanwhile, buttressed U.S. military and civilizational policies. Later, Cuba as owing gratitude to the U.S. "liberator" justified the Piatt Amendment and still today, the metaphor of "neighborhood" allowed U.S. observers either to express concern or to restore order if the island made too much "trouble" (p. 37).

Perez offers a few metaphors of his own–"laboratory" and "microcosm," for instance–to add how the U.S.-Cuba relationship, while unique, also exemplified the cultural deployment of U.S. power elsewhere (p. 1). He even claims that this metaphorical armada helped Americans define themselves as a nation–a pure, self-less, moral global power.

This frontier mythology guarantees nuclear imperialism and violence.

Slotkin 85 (Richard, Olin Professor of American Studies @ Wesleyan, The Fatal Environment, p. 60-61)

This ideology of savage war has become an essential trope of our mythologization of history, a cliche of political discourse especially in wartime. In the 1890s imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt rationalized draconian military measures against the Filipinos by comparing them to Apaches. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his multivolume history of naval operations in the Second World War, recounts the posting of this slogan at fleet headquarters in the South Pacific: "KILL JAPS, KILL JAPS, KILL MORE JAPS!" Suspecting that peacetime readers may find the sentiment unacceptably extreme, Morison offers the following rationale; This may shock you, reader; but it is exactly how we felt. We were fighting no civilized, knightly war . . . We were back to primitive days of fighting Indians on the American frontier; no holds barred and no quarter. The Japs wanted it that way, thought they could thus terrify an "effete democracy"; and that is what they got, with the additional horrors of war that modem science can produce.17 It is possible that the last sentence is an oblique reference to the use of the atomic bomb at the war's end. But aside from that, Morison seems actually to overstate the extraordinary character of the counterviolence against the Japanese (we did, after all, grant quarter) in order to rationalize the strength of his sentiments. Note too the dramatization of the conflict as a vindication of our cultural masculinity against the accusations of "effeteness." The trope of savage war thus enriches the symbolic meaning of specific acts of war, transforming them into episodes of character building, moral vindication, and regeneration. At the same time it provides advance justification for a pressing of the war to the extreme point of extermination, "war without quarter": and it puts the moral responsibility for that outcome on the enemy, which is to say, on its predicted victims. As we analyze the structure and meaning of this mythology of violence, it is important that we keep in mind the distinction between the myth and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. Mythology reproduces the world with its significances heightened beyond normal measure, so that the smallest actions are heavy with cosmic significances, and every conflict appears to press toward ultimate fatalities and final solutions. The American mythology of violence continually invokes the prospect of genocidal warfare and apocalyptic, world-destroying massacres; and there is enough violence in the history of the Indian wars, the slave trade, the labor/management strife of industrialization, the crimes and riots of our chaotic urbanization, and our wars against nationalist and Communist insurgencies in Asia and Latin America to justify many critics in the belief that America is an exceptionally violent society.

The alternative is to vote negative as a rejection of frontier ideology – we must historically contest the narratives which drive our actions.

Trofanenko 05 (Brenda, Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Illinois, The Social Studies, Sept/Oct)

The debates about the overwhelming problems, limitations, and disadvantages of social studies education noted in the Fordham report attempt to reconcile and advance the idea of nation through a collective history. Our more pressing role as educators, in light of the Fordham report, is to discuss a more nuanced understanding of the U.S. history. This would advance, as noted in La Pietra Report, an understanding about “the complexity and the contexts of relations and interactions, including the ways in which they are infused with a variety of forms of power that define and result from the interconnections of distinct but related histories” (OAH 2000, 1). Taking the U.S. nation as only one example of social analysis involves recognizing the meanings and conditions out of which nations are formed. There is no one experience of belonging to a nation, no single understanding or enactment of sovereignty, and certainly no one meaning or experience of colonization or being colonized. There is, then, a need for these issues to be realized and to be a part of the questioning occurring within our classrooms. That would allow for the substantial reframing of the basic narrative of U.S. history (OAH 2000, 2). Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that “common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience” (27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students’ realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as “the ideological alibi of the territorial state” (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history’s constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.